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. I n t r o d u c t i o n selection of the later [4, 5] . He argues while cost is an unavoidable "evil" for other 48 adaptations, it is a necessity for signals [4, 5] . 49
On the other hand, recent models of "costly signalling" paint a slightly different 50 picture: The equilibrium cost for honest signallers can be zero or even negative, only potential 51 cheaters have to pay a cost [6] [7] [8] [9] . It also turned out that partially honest, so called "pooling" 52 equilibria can be cost free [10, 11] . However, signal cost still seems to be an essential 53 ingredient of honest signalling even in these models: (i) signals have a cost function and (ii) 54 potential cheaters pay a cost for deviating from the equilibrium. 55
All in all, while these models challenge Zahavi's main prediction about the role of 56 equilibrium cost, they do not challenge the role of signal cost. Here I show that signal cost is 57 not an essential ingredient of honest signalling: signals with benefit functions can be honest 58 and evolutionarily stable even under conflict of interest. I call these signals as "beneficial 59 signals" as opposed to "costly signals". I show the existence of a fully honest (separating) 60 equilibrium without any signal cost function at all. At this equilibrium both low and high-61 4 quality signallers benefit from the signals, that is, no one pays any cost at our out of 62 equilibrium, yet the signalling system is honest and it is evolutionarily stable. 63
The model is a simple action-response game widely investigated in the biological 66 literature [6, 7, [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . It is a two-player game with a signaller and a receiver, where the 67 receiver controls an indivisible resource. There are two types of signallers: low and high 68 quality. Both type benefits from obtaining the resource. The receiver only benefits from 69 transferring the resource to a high-quality individual. Signallers have an option to give a 70 signal; in the standard literature this signal is costly. This signal may or may not be not be 71
honest. 72
The receivers' fitness (F r ) depends both on the signaller's quality (a), which can be high 73 (H) or low (L) and on the receiver's response (z), which can be up (U): to give the resource, or 74 down (D): not to give the resource. The signaller's fitness (F s ) is the sum of the value of the 75 resource (V), minus the cost of signalling (C). The resource may be more valuable to low or to 76 high quality signallers, accordingly the value of the resource (V) both depends on the quality 77 of the signaller (a) and on the receiver's response (z). Last but not least, the cost of signalling 78 (C) depends on the quality of the signaller (a) and on the signaller's behaviour (b), which can 79 be to signal (S) or not to signal (N). Accordingly, F r and F s can be written up respectively as 80 follows: 81
The fitness of each player can be influenced (r) by the survival of the other player. For 84 example, they can be related, or they might belong to the same group (see Maynard Smith, 85 5 1991) . With the help of r it is possible to describe different situations, for instance, where this 86 interdependence is high (r>>0, e.g. parent-offspring communication) or situations without 87 relatedness and additional interactions (i.e. r=0). Based on these assumptions the inclusive 88 fitness of the signaller (E s ) and the receiver (E r ) can be written as follows: 89
Let V h and V l denote the difference in fitness for high-, and low-quality signaller 92 respectively between obtaining the resource or not (Hurd, 1995; Számadó, 1999) : 93
We can define W h , W l and C h , C l in a similar way: 96
100 This notation will be used in the rest of the article (see Table 1 . for a summary). Figure  101 1 depicts the signalling game, Table 2 gives the fitness values corresponding to each node. 102
Before proceeding to the new set of solutions it is useful to recapture the conditions of 103 honest signalling. Honest signalling under conflict of interest can be characterized by three 104 sets of conditions [7] : (i) the receiver's, (ii) the signaller's (iii) and the conflict of interest 105 condition. The receiver's condition states that the receiver should react to different signaller 106 differently. At the traditional signalling equilibrium it should give an Up (U) response to High 107 quality signaller but it should turn Down (D) Low quality ones. Accordingly, the following 108 inequalities must be fulfilled: 109
The signaller's condition specifies that signallers should act differently at the honest 113
equilibrium: High quality signallers should signal (S); low quality signallers should not 114 signal (N) at the traditional signalling equilibrium. Accordingly, the potential benefits from 115 signalling should be larger than the cost for high quality signallers and vice versa: 116
Last but not least, the conflict of interest should be specified. It implies that receiving the 119 resource is beneficial for both signaller types: 120
Note that in all of these conditions both the benefit and the cost denote differences 123 between two actions (see Eqs. 5-10): giving or not giving the resource (W*), receiving or not 124 receiving the resource (V*), and finally giving or not giving a signal (C*). Accordingly, 125
negative values of C h or C l implies only that not giving a signal is more costly than giving (i.e. 126
C(*,N) > C(*,S)); however, this condition tells nothing about the absolute values of C(*,S) 127
and C(*,N) . Here I investigate the possibility of negative cost (benefit) in the absolute sense, 128
i.e. that both 0> C(*,S) and 0> C(*,N). Eqs. 13 and 14 can be fulfilled alongside of the benefit assumption (i.e. 0> C(*,S), C(*,N)). 137
Substituting the cost functions (C(*,S), C(*,N)) into the equations we get: 138
We can see, that in order for the first inequality to be satisfied the benefit from non-signalling 141 has to be higher than the benefit from signalling for Low quality individuals; and it has to be 142 higher so that non-signalling compensates Low quality signallers for the loss of not receiving 143
The opposite relation holds for High quality signallers: 146
The benefit of non-signalling has to be smaller than the sum of the benefit they get receiving 148 the resource and giving the signal. 149
Figures 2 and 3 depicts these and all other possible relations for Low and for High quality 150 signallers respectively, in a differential cost model. There are five different regions for Low 151 quality signallers (Fig. 2) : 152
in the first region both non-signalling (C(L,N) ) and signalling (C(L,S)) is costly; 153
(ii) in the second region (which denotes the line where C(L,N)=0) non-signalling has 154 zero cost and signalling is costly, this is the standard set of assumptions of 155 signalling models; 156 8 (iii) in the third region non-signalling is beneficial (it has a negative cost) yet signalling 157 is still costly; 158 (iv) in the fourth region (which denotes the line where C(L,S)=0) non-signalling is 159 beneficial and signalling has zero cost; 160 (v) finally in the last, fifth region both non-signalling and signalling is beneficial. In 161 other words, in this last region Low quality signallers get a benefit regardless of 162 which action they chose, and this benefit is independent from the receiver's 163 response yet signalling still can be honest and evolutionarily stable. 164 Table 3 gives numerical examples for all regions (benefits in the model are as follows: V h = 1, 165
There are seven different regions for High quality signallers ( Fig. 3) : 167
in the first region both non-signalling (C(H,N) ) and signalling (C(H,S)) is costly; 168
(ii) in the second region (which denotes the line where C(H,N)=0) non-signalling has 169 zero cost and signalling is costly; 170 (iii) in the third region non-signalling is beneficial (it has a negative cost) yet signalling 171 is still costly; 172 (iv) in the fourth region (which denotes the line where C(H,S)=0) non-signalling is 173 beneficial and signalling has zero cost; 174 (v) in the fifth region both non-signalling and signalling is beneficial; (vi) in the sixth 175 region signalling is beneficial yet non-signalling has zero cost; 176 (vi) in the sixth region (which denotes the line where C(H,N)=0) non-signalling has 177 zero cost and signalling is beneficial; 178 (vii) in the seventh region non-signalling is costly, yet signalling is beneficial; 179 (viii) and finally in the eights region (which denotes the line where C(H,S)=0) non-180 signalling is costly and signalling has zero cost. 181 Table 4 gives numerical examples for all regions (benefits are the same as before). 182
The traditional assumption is region 2 for both Low and High quality signallers (i.e. non-183 signalling has zero cost but signalling is costly). However, all these regions fit the conditions 184 outlined in Eqs. 19 and 20 thus any combination of these regions is a solution. The important 185 idea is that it is not a simple linear rescaling of the pay-offs for low and High quality 186 signallers because these regions can be combined independently, which may result in 187 unexpected or seemingly paradoxical parameter combinations that still can maintain honest 188 signalling even under conflict of interest. All in all, there are 5x8=40 potential combinations; 189 here I only discuss a few counter-intuitive examples. 190
(1) For example, it is possible that both non-signalling and signalling is costly for High 191 quality signallers (Fig.3 region 1 ); yet both non-signalling and signalling is beneficial for Low 192 quality signallers (Fig.2 region 5 ). In this example High quality signallers invest in signals 193 and they are compensated by the receiver's response, whereas Low quality signallers are 194 compensated for the loss of receiver's response by the benefit they receive for non-signalling. 195
(2) Interestingly enough the opposite is equally possible: that High quality signallers 196 receive benefits for both non-signalling and signalling (Fig.3 region 5 ) yet Low quality 197 signallers have to pay a cost for both non-signalling and for signalling (Fig.2 region 1 
We can see that the same cost function has to satisfy both conditions. Accordingly, we have 215 the following inequalities: 216
This implies that the difference between the costs of signalling and non-signalling has to be 218 larger than the benefits from the Up response for Low quality signallers but this difference has 219 to be smaller than the benefits from Up response for High quality signallers. 220 Figure 4 depicts the regions that satisfy the above condition in differential benefit models. 221
There are five different regions in Fig. 4 : 222 (i) in the first region both non-signalling (C(N)) and signalling (C(S)) is costly; 223 (ii) in the second region non-signalling has zero cost and signalling is costly; 224 (iii) in the third region non-signalling is beneficial (it has a negative cost) yet signalling 225 is still costly; 226 (iv) in the fourth region non-signalling is beneficial and signalling has zero cost; 227 (v) finally, in the last region both non-signalling and signalling is beneficial. 228
The second region describes the traditional assumption of the signalling models and thus it 229 corresponds to the classic Sir Philip Sydney game [15] . However, the most interesting is the 230 fifth region, where just as before, signallers receive a benefit both from non-signalling and 231 11 from signalling. Table 5 cost, as it can be a result of a benefit function. This "potential cost of cheating" is a fitness 247 difference between two actions (to signal vs. not to signal) and this fitness difference can be 248 negative even if both of the actions are beneficial on the first place. 249
Previous models were able to show that honest signals do not have to be costly for 250 honest signallers to be evolutionarily stable, not even under conflict of interest [6] [7] [8] . The 251 current result goes one step further, as it shows that signals need no cost at all to be honest. 252
There is no need for production cost, maintenance cost, social cost, inclusive fitness cost, etc. 253
This result invalidates Zahavi's claim [4] about the special role of "signal selection". Honest12 signalling is possible without signal cost: costly signalling is just one possible 255 implementation, it is not a necessity. 256
The result also shows the limits of the 'costly signalling' paradigm [16, 17] . Costly 257 signalling models in biology arrived at the conclusion of costly equilibrium because of the 258 costly signalling assumptions of these models. In other words, the conclusion of the costly 259 signalling models is built into the assumptions. Had the authors of these models investigated a 260 benefit function instead of cost function, they would have arrived at the conclusion of 261 beneficial equilibria. The 'costly signalling' assumption might be realistic and important, yet 262 it is not a necessity or a 'principle'. 263
Honest signalling and costly signalling have the same relation as natural selection vs. 264 mendelian inheritance. Natural selection is the general principle: it assumes competition, 265 reproduction, inheritance and variation. Mendelian inheritance is one possible implementation 266 of an inheritance system that allows natural selection to work. Honest signalling is the general 267 principle, costly signalling is a specific implementation that allows honest signalling to 268 operate. Mendelian inheritance is not an overreaching "principle", though it happens to be the 269 most important inheritance system for "higher life". The same way, "costly signalling" is not 270 overreaching "principle" or necessity, though arguably it happens to be a very important 271 mechanism of honest signalling. 272
Moreover, the Handicap Principle and the costly signalling paradigm is misleading 273 because it suggested that measuring the "cost of signals" at the equilibrium provides valuable 274 information about the source of honesty [1, 4] . As consequence hundreds of studies tried to 275 measure out the equilibrium cost of signals without offering solid evidence in favour of the 276
Handicap Principle [18, 19] . This is not surprising however, because measuring equilibrium 277 cost is not informative, one has to measure out of equilibrium costs [8, 20] . However, 278 13 measuring out of equilibrium cost in itself is not informative either. The cost is only 279 informative in relation to the benefits of the action. What has to be measured is the pay-off 280 resulting from the alternative actions (i.e. trade-offs). Unfortunately, the number of studies 281 comparing out-of-equilibrium cost and benefits (i.e. signal trade-offs) is negligible (but see 282
[21]). 283
All in all, signal cost is not a necessary ingredient of honesty: honesty needs no cost. 284
Of course, it does not imply that signal cost cannot play a role in the maintenance of honesty; 285 however, this is an empirical question and not a theoretical necessity. Figure 1 , where Es and Er 358 denote the inclusive fitness of the signaller and the receiver respectively. The fitness of both 359 players is a combination of the benefit they receive as a result of the receiver's decision and 360 the costs/benefits resulting from the signaller's decision. 361
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